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Introduction 
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 under the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini, which led to 
the overthrow of Pahlavi monarchy and established the Islamic Republic of Iran, can be seen 
as one of the most important points in the history of modern world, and especially in shaping 
of the Middle East region today. The Islamic Revolution and the Ayatollah brought with 
themselves a state apparatus based on religious and sectarian ideology of Shia Islam, which 
possibly defined the beginning years of the Islamic Republic. The initial years were mainly 
characterized by U.S embassy hostage crisis, hard-lined Islamic policies and fatwas, political 
suppression and assassinations, and a dwindling world support, which could also be observed 
during the Iran-Iraq war. Another characteristic of the new administration was the proclaimed 
hatred towards Israel and the United States, with the latter being labelled as the „Great Satan‟. 
But even during the initial years of the revolution and despite the proclaimed hatred 
towards both Israel and U.S., Iran was pragmatic to go forward in dealing with them when it 
seemed to be in its interests, most notably the Iran-Contra Affair of 1985. A major turn of 
events came after the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and Ali Khamenei becoming the 
Supreme Leader of Iran, and under the presidency of reformists and moderates like Akbar 
Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami. These leaders led the charge of changing the perception 
the world had of Iran, with renewed focus on improving relations with not only the Middle 
East countries, but others including the Western states as well, and emphasis on better 
economic and scientific cooperation; and put the ideological rhetoric of the Islamic 
Revolution on a backburner. Thus, it can be argued that Iran‟s foreign policy is influenced by 
religion to a certain extent, but it is not a driving factor, rather can be seen as driven more by 
national security and economic interests based on realpolitik considerations.
1
 
Iranian authorities have always denied that there actions are based on sectarian grounds, 
and so have many scholars who have studied Iran‟s foreign policy.2 Although some kind of 
sectarian leanings can be seen, there are many notable examples where we can see Iran acting 
above its Shia identity in its international relations. Iran has also held a strict anti-U.S. and 
                                                          
1
 This argument has been put forward by many scholars over the years including Byman (2001), Milani (2006), 
Toscano (2012) and Ostovar (2016). 
2
 Afshon Ostovar, “Sectarian Dilemmas In Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy And Identity Politics 
Collide,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016. 
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anti-Israel ideology,
3
 while at occasions it has been known to cooperate with them in seeking 
its nationalistic goals.
4
 But very little work has been done to understand Iran‟s foreign policy 
decision making based on its national security and economic considerations, and is generally 
assumed to be based on the rhetoric of religious ideology, especially in the Western 
perception. Also, the literature on Iran‟s foreign policy generally classifies it based on 
different world regions and seldom looks at its neighbouring countries as a whole.  
In this research, I would be looking at the foreign policy of Iran based on realpolitik 
considerations like national security and economic interests with respect to the situations of 
conflict in its immediate neighbourhood, i.e. nations which share their land borders with Iran. 
I would be looking at the case studies of Iran‟s cooperation with the United States in invasion 
of Afghanistan and Iraq, its support to the Karzai administration (led by majority Sunni 
leaders) in Afghanistan and to a Christian Armenia in its conflict with a Shia Azerbaijan, and 
the following relations with both the nations. Hence the question for this research is “How 
have realpolitik considerations played a role in driving Iran‟s foreign policy with respect to 
the situations of armed conflict in its neighbouring countries?” 
Literature Review 
The theory of realpolitik has been around since the time of Thucydides, with many 
scholars and thinkers in history writing about it. In contemporary times, realpolitik in the 
field of international relations has been associated with various scholars and leaders, most 
notably Morgenthau (1978), Cohen (1975) and Bew (2015), and Henry Kissinger and Mao 
Zedong are regarded as famous proponents of realpolitik in contemporary times. 
Modern day realpolitik is argued to be less of a political theory but rather a philosophy or 
a way of conducting the business of politics, and Bew talks about it as “a vision of the future 
and a guide for how to get there” by making decisions based on national interests in order to 
achieve pragmatic objectives.
5
 Gochman and Leng defined two vital issues in realpolitik as 
political independence of state and the survival of the regime and control over the territory 
within national borders. They see the survival of the regime as central to the realpolitik 
                                                          
3
 Iran‟s foreign policy towards U.S. and Israel are seen as exceptions to the generalizations, notably by Byman 
in Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. 
4
 Iran had extensive dealings with Israel during the Iran-Iraq war, including Iran-Contra Affair, and has 
regularly sought better cooperation with the United States. This has extensively been documented by Parsi in his 
book Treacherous Alliance (2007). 
5
 John Bew, Realpolitik: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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approach and necessary for the pursuit of national objectives.
6
 They also state that the key 
component of realpolitik lies in rational decision making, and further call it as not being a 
proponent of war and the military force as being just a tool of statecraft but not the primary 
one, as realpolitik demands minimizing the risks while at the same time maximization of the 
benefits.  
Many scholars have argued that the Iran‟s foreign policy can be viewed as realpolitik 
rather than on the basis of religious identity. Ehteshami has commented that “Revolutionary 
Iran has always been a “rational actor” in the classic Realist mold”7; Akbarzadeh further 
added that “the roots and aims of Iran‟s foreign policy are defensive, mainly pragmatic and 
based on state oriented and strategic issues.”8 Barzegar argued that “the roots and aims of 
Iran‟s foreign policy are defensive, mainly pragmatic and based on state oriented and 
strategic issues.”9 Takeyh also supports this argument about the Islamic Republic by stating 
that “Iran‟s internal policies are increasingly driven by economic calculations, while its 
international relations are largely predicated on rational designs.”10  
It has also been argued that despite being an autocratic ruler, Ayatollah Khamenei is 
sensitive towards the perception of his image among the Iranian public,
11
 and thus this 
perception matters when it comes to decision making of the government. But still Tehran 
took decisions like supporting Armenia which was sure to anger its Azeri population which 
stands at about 20 million, or cooperating with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
which directly went against its domestic rhetoric of Islamic Revolution. Although the threat 
of facing a lash from its own population, Tehran went ahead with the actions countering its 
ideologue, deciding them as being in Iran‟s interests. 
Takeyh describes Iran‟s foreign policy understanding as defined by „three circles‟: the 
Persian Gulf region, the Arab Middle East, and Eurasia, with Persian Gulf being most 
important; it might be driven by ideology in one region, but by geo-political national interests 
                                                          
6
 Charles S. Gochman and Russell J. Leng, “Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and 
Behavior,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar 1983): 100. 
7
 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “The foreign policy of Iran” in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States ed. 
Raymond Hinnebusch & Anoushiravan Ehteshami (London, Lynne Rienner: 2002): 284 
8
 Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Iran‟s Policy towards Afghanistan: In the Shadow of the United States,” Journal of 
Asian Security and International Affairs 1(1) (2014): 65. 
9
 Kayhan Barzegar, "Iran‟s foreign policy in post-invasion Iraq", Middle East Policy 15(4) (2008): 47 
10
 Ray Takeyh, “Re-imagining U.S.-Iranian Relations,” Survival 44:3 (2002): 24. 
11
 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York, Times Books: 2006): 69 
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in the other.
12
 But defining the foreign policy for entire Eurasian region in a same context is 
simply not possible as the region is too broad for any generalization. It can be observed 
through history that different aspects can be present while dealing with a same country or 
„circle‟ depending on the bilateral and regional conditions and objectives. For example, Iran‟s 
policy towards its eastern neighbours Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been 
different from each other. Also at the same time we need to keep in mind the difference 
between Iran‟s domestic rhetoric of ideology and sectarianism and foreign policy designs 
based on strategic calculations. 
Many authors have also argued that its arch rival United States forms a key driver in 
Iran‟s foreign policy. This has also promoted a lot of scholarly work with regard to U.S. - 
Iran relations. But at the same time relatively less has been written about how Iran‟s relations 
with other countries are influenced by their existing relations or presence of United States, 
especially so when it comes to U.S. presence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Also, 
most authors have failed to mention the fact that right since the time of Rafsanjani Iran has 
also regularly sought better economic and scientific cooperation with the United States. Both 
Rafsanjani and Khatami have focused on improving relations with the United States, 
especially economic relations which would have led to an improved domestic economic 
situation, notably high inflation and unemployment.
13
 
The presence of United States affects the regional power dynamics. Many authors 
including Milani (2006) and Barzegar (2014) have argued that Iran seeks to re-establish itself 
as an economic hub and a regional power, which directly motivates its foreign policy 
decisions. It actively pursues its foreign interests and seeks to increase its influence not only 
in its neighbourhood but in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia at large, with better relations 
with China, Russia, India, and countries in the Middle East and Europe as well. Many 
scholars have identified and acknowledged these ambitions of Iran, but at the same time they 
have failed to evaluate and deeply analyse them. Therefore, Iran also does not wish to see any 
significant shift of power in the region. This was also observed when the Taliban came to 
power in Afghanistan with their strong anti-Iran ideology, prompting Iran to extend its 
support to Northern Alliance. This is another reason why Iran does not wish U.S. presence in 
its neighbourhood, as it views it as a direct challenge to Iran‟s power and influence. 
                                                          
12
 Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 60 
13
 Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, “Islamic Realpolitik: Two-Level Iranian Foreign Policy,” International 
Journal on World Peace Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 2009): 17 
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Another issue which is not frequently talked about is the changing dimension of Iran‟s 
foreign policy in the region. For the past couple of years Iran has shifted its policy of support 
to armed non-state actors to using economic influence and soft power. Iran has been reported 
to support armed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and Northern Alliance and other Afghan 
warlords as well, including some reports even suggesting its support to Taliban and al-
Qaeda.
14
 Rather, with the changing dynamics of Iran‟s regional policy, most notably with 
regard to its northern and eastern neighbours, it has focused more on soft power, through 
cultural diplomacy, trade and tourism promotion, economic assistance, and infrastructure 
development and reconstruction.
15
 While Iran still continues to support non-state actors, it has 
diverted a significant amount of resources towards establishing its soft power. And although 
many authors have identified the „soft power dimension‟ of Iran‟s policy, it has not been 
classified in terms of country-specific or region-specific phenomenon. 
Last, but not the least, is the problem of perspective. A large majority of the work done on 
Iran‟s foreign policy provides a third-person or at best a second-person Western perspective. 
These works mainly reflect on events and issues with the U.S. as the „protagonist‟. So this 
leads us to understand aspects like „what happened‟ or „what it meant for the West or its 
allies‟. This also forms the cause as to why Iran‟s foreign policy is viewed to be irrational or 
ideologically motivated by the common people. Notable exceptions to this are the authors 
Parsi, Milani and Akbarzadeh, who through their works have provided an Iranian point of 
view. So instead of „what happened‟, they help us understand „what led to it‟ or „reasons as to 
why Iran does something‟ and „how does it align‟ with Iran‟s foreign policy interests. 
Contribution 
While much has been studied and written about the foreign policy and external relations 
of Iran, much less has been studied regarding Iran‟s policy and its relations with its 
immediate neighbours, and even lesser with keeping in mind specifically the situation of 
conflicts prevalent in Iran‟s neighbourhood, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the conflict 
of Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although these conflicts have been 
studied with due importance to Iran, almost nowhere in the literature of Iran are these issues 
found together. Through this study I would be bringing the situation of armed conflicts in 
                                                          
14
 Amir M. Haji-Yousefi, “Iran‟s Foreign policy in Afghanistan: The Current Situation and Future Prospects,” 
South Asian Studies Vol. 27, No. 1 (2012): 70 
15
 The soft power aspect of Iran‟s foreign policy in its neighborhood forms my key arguments with regard to the 
relations with its neighbors. 
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Iran‟s neighbouring countries together, and Iran‟s pragmatic decision making in its foreign 
policy evolving around these external conflicts. 
Also, I would try to emphasise on the gap in „why‟ and „how‟ part; most of the studies 
have evaluated how Iran acted in terms of its support to other states. I would try to focus on 
the „why‟ part – why did Iran act in the way it did and what benefits did Iran seek to achieve 
through it in terms of national security and economic interests. In other words, I would be 
trying to do this study from an Iranian point of view, which in itself is not very often present 
across the literature. 
While it is true from a geo-politics perspective that Iran wants to stay a powerful actor in 
its neighbourhood, I‟ll be making an argument that Iran is not afraid to make decisions 
contradicting its ideology of Islamic revolution to achieve its aims, particularly with respect 
to states sharing border with Iran. This includes supporting the Karzai government which is 
majorly Sunni, supporting Armenia which is a Christian state, against Azerbaijan, given the 
fact that it is Shia and ethnic Azeris form almost 15% of Iranian population, and Iran‟s 
cooperation with „The Great Satan‟ in Afghanistan and Iraq. The last two cases are 
specifically important as they go directly against its rhetoric of Islamic Revolution. This 
study will also add to what Takeyh defined as „three circles‟ of Iran‟s foreign policy, arguing 
its pragmatic decision making and maintaining its geo-political interests along with regional 
power balance in situations of turmoil in its immediate neighbourhood. 
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Research Outline 
I would be trying to interpret the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in its 
immediate neighbourhood with respect to its national security and economic interests. Being 
a major power in the Middle East region, Iran has not spent huge sums of money on 
modernizing the arms and equipment for its military forces. Rather it relies a lot on economic 
support to various state and non-state actors in carrying out its interests. My area of 
concentration would be Iran‟s neighbouring countries, notably Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan 
and Armenia, and the presence of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the focus 
would be on Iran setting aside its religious ideology of Shia Islam and Islamic Revolution in 
order to advance its security and economic goals on pragmatic considerations. 
The main question of the research is further divided into three sub-questions (SQs) as 
listed below, which will be my case-studies in order to form my argument on Iran‟s foreign 
policy. 
SQ 1. Why did Iran go against its ideological rhetoric and cooperate with the United States 
(which it considers its arch enemy) in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq 
in 2003 and how did it hope to benefit from this cooperation? 
SQ 2. Why did Iran support the majority Sunni government of Hamid Karzai post the 
downfall of the Taliban in 2001 and also invest in the stabilization and 
reconstruction of Afghanistan? 
SQ 3. What were the reasons for Iran extending its support to Christian Armenia against a 
Shia Azerbaijan during and post the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1993 and how it 
has acted in its relations with both the nations with regard to its national security 
and economic interests? 
 
Each sub-question lays emphasis on realpolitik decisions of Iran‟s foreign policy keeping 
in mind the history of the events that took place and Iran‟s actions regarding the same. The 
sub-questions will take into account the effect of Iran‟s actions with respect to the conflicts, 
and the role and support of Iran towards different sides of the conflict, specifically with 
regard to its own national interests, and the role of United States and Iran‟s attitude towards 
its presence. They will also take into account the various economic and security benefits Iran 
achieved or expected to achieve out of its decisions. By trying to answer these questions and 
S1855581   Ahlawat 10 
 
the events that followed, I would try to reflect on how the foreign policy of Iran can be seen 
as based on realpolitik. 
However, a few limitations to the research need to be kept in mind while discussing the 
research outline. A major constraint would be the limitation of time and word count available 
for the thesis. Also the availability of resources and research work present and available, as I 
would be mainly focusing on sources and works available in English due to the lack of the 
knowledge of Persian, the official language of Iran. The limited availability of literature 
focusing on the national interests of Iran and evaluating the reasons behind its foreign policy 
decision making would also form a major limitation for this research.  
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Theory 
Realpolitik can be best understood as politics driven by practical reasoning rather than 
based on moral or ideological considerations. In the view of August Ludwig von Rochau, a 
mid-nineteenth century German thinker regarded as the father of modern realpolitik by 
Bew
16
, realpolitik is not exactly a philosophy, but rather a method of working through 
contradictions emerging as a result of various forces. Humphreys also describes realpolitik 
most of all as an approach to foreign policy in which “preservation of the state and promotion 
of the national interest are the ultimate goals and power is the primary tool for achieving 
those ends” and “national interest be prioritized over all other ends and values,” and it does 
not matter even if it is held to be immoral at times.
17
 
Bew argues that the meaning of the term „realpolitik‟ has evolved over time, making a 
distinction between old German realpolitik and the modern day realpolitik of the English-
speaking world, with the latter denoting more of a posture or a „philosophical inclination‟, 
rather than a theory of international relations, and calling it, in words of Rochau himself, “a 
mere measuring and weighing and calculating of facts that need to be processed politically.”18 
Rothe also described realpolitik as “a framework that serves as a guide for policymaking 
(italics mine).”19 Simply put, realpolitik is not really a political theory per se, but more of an 
approach to foreign policy decision making as based on practical considerations. 
In Humphreys terms, realpolitik interests of a sovereign state can be „reasonably 
straightforwardly identified‟, are defined in terms of power and work towards maintaining 
and enhancing the international position of the state.
20
 Wayman and Diehl identified that 
states guided by realpolitik can use various measures including military, economic and 
political means to attain this power.
21
 As Cohen also points out, in realpolitik terms, “The 
security of a state will be most readily enhanced if it follows policies which will ultimately 
result in increase in its own power or decreases or at least no increases in its opponent‟s 
                                                          
16
 Bew, Realpolitik 
17
 Adam R. C. Humphreys, “Realpolitik” in The Encyclopedia of Political Thought ed. Michael Gibbons (New 
Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 
18
 Bew, Realpolitik, 301 
19
 Dawn L. Rothe, “Exploring Post-Resistance to State Criminality: Realpolitik Versus Ideology”, Social Justice 
36(3) (2010) 
20
 Humphreys, “Realpolitik” 
21
 Frank Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, Reconstructing Realpolitik (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1994): 3-26 
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power.”22 Thus, realpolitik is a proponent of using all the means or combination of means at 
state‟s disposal in order to wield its power and influence in an international arena, and 
maximise its own interests through any possible means. 
Bew further identified realpolitik as based on multiple levels, for building a „nation-state 
in an unsteady and rapidly changing environment, without recourse to violent convulsion or 
repression‟23: holding real power as compared to claim or right of holding power or 
sovereignty (de-facto versus de-jure power), social and economic conditions and their effect 
on the distribution of power, and presence of ideological undercurrents.
24
 He therefore 
presents a view of power over and above the military might, also classifying de-facto power, 
as inclusive of economic considerations, culture and history, religion and ideology, 
emphasising much on soft power and influence rather than simply based on hard power. 
Realpolitik as a principle works in consideration of all the above factors. 
Although the origins of realpolitik can be traced down from „realism‟, and despite the two 
terms being used interchangeably colloquially in the modern world, the difference between 
them is necessary to be identified. Realism primarily identifies states as only international 
actors which aim at maximizing their power, mainly in military terms, with armaments and 
weapons as means of power and security. Further, it focuses on maintaining the status quo 
and rules out any cooperation between states and does not talk about major changes and 
evolving international environment. Realpolitik on the other hand, as also previously 
discussed, encompasses a range of options, including political, military, economic, and/or 
other combinations in order to pursue the pragmatic interests of the state; and includes non-
state actors and cooperation between different actors as means to strengthening of 
international position. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, realpolitik is defined as a principle of foreign 
policy which encompasses utilization of all the means available to the state in order to pursue 
its pragmatic interests in its international relations. This includes not only means such as 
political, economic, military, diplomacy, culture, shared history, religion and ideology, but 
also cooperation and alliance formation between different state and non-state actors in order 
to advance ones objectives in order to improve and strengthen its position in the region and in 
the world order at large. Also, the international position does not only include the military 
                                                          
22
 Ira S. Cohen, Realpolitik: Theory and Practice (California: Dickenson Pub. Co., 1975), 172 
23
 Bew, Realpolitik,18 
24
 Ibid., 300 
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standing, but comprises of economic and cultural influence and soft power, which without the 
use of military power can compel another actor to fulfil the will of the state. 
Iran has been known to not invest very significantly on its military power, in modernizing 
its weapons and armaments, especially in comparison to its Arab neighbours like Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Instead, it relies on a combination of non-state actors, 
diplomacy and economic and cultural influence in its foreign policy to pursue its interests in 
the region. In the words of President Khatami, “Foreign policy does not mean guns and rifles, 
but utilizing all legitimate means to convince others.”25 I would like to suggest that the 
Iranian foreign policy is based on realpolitik considerations. On multiple occasions Iran has 
been known to rise above the rhetoric of Islamic revolution and work on pragmatic foreign 
policy objectives in order to, as the theory of realpolitik above suggests, advance its 
international position in terms of its national security and economic interests. 
At the same time it is important to understand that it is not possible for realpolitik by 
itself to account for all the foreign policy decisions of a state. As with any other political 
principle, only one theory or principle by itself is insufficient to understand all the decisions 
made by a nation, which has to include multiple considerations before making any policy 
decisions. This can be assumed as the case with Iran as well. While many scholars have 
argued that Iran‟s policies are based on realpolitik, we need to look at them through different 
lenses to get a better understanding. For this study, Iran‟s foreign policy decisions in its 
immediate neighbourhood is looked upon from the lens of realpolitik, as use of various 
means available and not limited by an ideology or such in order to advance its national 
security and economic interests and influence in the region. 
  
                                                          
25
 Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 111 
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Methodology 
The methodology that will be used for the purpose of this research is across case analysis, 
qualitative study and case oriented approach. A qualitative study of the three case studies 
would be done evaluating the reasons behind Iran‟s foreign policy decisions and how it 
benefitted or hoped to benefit from them in medium to long term. A case oriented approach 
will also help understand the commonalities in Iran‟s decision making throughout the 
different case studies. I have chosen three different case studies on Iran‟s decisions and 
actions with regard to the situation of armed conflict in its neighbouring countries where Iran 
acted over and above its ideology of Shia Islam and Islamic Revolution and worked with 
regard to its national security and economic interests. Such a multiple case study approach 
takes in regard different regions and actors, like Iraq has both Sunni and Shia Muslim 
population and is part of the Middle East, Afghanistan is majority Sunni (almost 80%) and 
lies in Central Asia, and Azerbaijan is Shia Islam and Armenia is Christian, forming the part 
of South Caucasus region, and over that the presence of United States in almost all of these 
countries further helps in analysis of points of similarities across different case studies with 
respect to Iran.  
Case selection and analysis 
The first case study (defined as SQ 1 specified in Research Outline) is regarding Iran‟s 
cooperation with United States in invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran has time and again 
classified United States as one of its greatest enemies; the enmity can be traced back to 1953 
with the Shah coming to power with the support of United States, and its continued 
interference in Iran‟s internal affairs even after the downfall of the Shah.26 President 
Ahmadinejad also demanded an apology from the U.S. for “crimes committed against Iran”.27 
But at the same time Iran directly extended its cooperation to the United States in its invasion 
of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 (both Muslim regimes), which resulted in regime 
change and conflict situation in both the countries. This case study is crucial to understand for 
two reasons: first, reasons for Iran‟s cooperation with its arch enemy; and second, without 
direct military involvement, it strengthened Iran‟s position significantly in the region. 
                                                          
26
 Enayatollah Yazdani and Rizwan Hussain, “United States Policy towards Iran after the Islamic Revolution: 
An Iranian Perspective,” International Studies 43, 3 (2006): 270. 
27
 “Iranian leader demands U.S. apology,” BBC, 28 January 2009. Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7855444.stm  
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The second case study (defined as SQ 2) relates to the position of Iran on the Karzai 
administration in Afghanistan, which is majorly Sunni in religion. Since the fall of Taliban in 
December 2001, Iran has reflected a significant influence and soft power in Afghanistan. 
Tehran supported the stability and government formation post the fall of Taliban in 2001, as 
noted by Akbarzadeh, “In its early formative years, Tehran encouraged Shia and non-Pashtun 
ethnic groups to recognize and join the Karzai government. Tehran‟s appeal to Tajik and 
Uzbek leaders in the Northern Alliance was an important factor for political stability of the 
Karzai government.”28 This case study emphasises on how and why Tehran is interested in 
stability of Afghanistan and expanding its influence and soft power in the country (in pursuit 
of its national security and economic interests) rather than the religion of the administration. 
The third case study (defined as SQ 3) is based on Iran‟s support to Armenia against 
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1993 and the relations since. It is important 
because Armenia is a Christian state and Azerbaijan is Shia Muslim, and also ethnic Azeri 
people form almost 15% of Iran‟s population. Supporting a Christian state against a Shia one 
is in direct contradiction to Iran‟s religious rhetoric, yet this policy was preferred as seen in 
line with Iran‟s realpolitik interests. This case study analyses Iran‟s foreign relations with 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, its pragmatic dealings with both the nations, and how national 
security and economic considerations can be seen as forming the driving factor behind Iran‟s 
foreign policy towards the two countries. 
In all the three case studies above, we can observe Tehran put aside religion in order to 
serve pragmatic decisions based on national security and economic interests. These cases will 
form my arguments for the analysis of Iran‟s foreign policy based on realpolitik 
considerations instead of religious agenda, and how Iran benefitted or hoped to benefit from 
these policies. Based on the result of the analysis I plan to argue my hypothesis that Iran‟s 
foreign policy with regard to armed conflicts in its neighbouring countries can be seen as 
driven by the principle of realpolitik. 
 
  
                                                          
28
 Akbarzadeh, “Iran‟s Policy towards Afghanistan,” 68 
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Sub-Question 1: 
Helping the ‘Great Satan’: Iran – U.S. cooperation in invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq 
 
Despite calling the United States its arch rival, Iran has time and again showed pragmatic 
interests in cooperation with the U.S. The initial evidence for the same can be observed in the 
Iran-Contra affair during the Iran-Iraq war less than a decade after the Islamic Revolution and 
the acts of hostility towards the U.S. Then Iran under the presidency of Rafsanjani started 
indicating their interests in improving the relationship, first with Tehran Times (considered a 
mouth-piece of the Foreign Ministry) carrying in their editorial that “any sign of goodwill 
will be responded [to] by goodwill on the Iranian side”, soon followed by Rafsanjani himself 
declaring that improved relations with the U.S. “would not be in contradiction with Iran‟s 
objectives,”29 and showing their willingness of living with the U.S. presence in the Persian 
Gulf region under the leadership of President Khatami.
30
  
A major turn of events took place after President Khatami gave his famous interview to 
CNN which he started by congratulating “the followers of Jesus Christ” on New Year, and 
statements like “I respect the great American people” and “American civilization is worthy of 
respect.”31 U.S.-Iran relationship took a huge turn under the leadership of President Khatami, 
especially with regard to co-operation in the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. But at the 
same time many scholars have also argued that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran has played 
to their capacity of keeping the U.S. bogged down in their own game, so as to prevent any 
kind of threat it might pose to Iran. 
Iran‟s cooperation with the United States in the region can be seen as part of pragmatic 
decision making in achieving its foreign policy objectives keeping in mind the dynamics of 
the region. Iran has been well aware of the presence of the United States in the region of its 
neighbourhood, and under Khatami adapted a much more forward looking approach based on 
mutual cooperation instead of confrontation. This, clubbed with Iran‟s own aspirations of 
being a regional power urged it towards a limited cooperation with the U.S. Other aspirations 
of Iran, as also previously mentioned, are better economic and scientific cooperation, market 
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for its energy resources, lifting of sanctions, and its nuclear ambitions in the past decade all 
point towards the requirement pragmatic decisions and better cooperation with the U.S. 
The greatest turn of events in Iran-U.S. relations were perhaps the attacks on September 
11, 2001. Iran was quick to show empathy with the United States, with President Khatami 
expressing his condolences and demonstrations against terrorism on Iran‟s streets.32 Khatami 
soon realized the window of opportunity opened by the War on Terror and the invasion of 
Afghanistan, where the U.S. needed Iran‟s expertise in the region, intelligence and its 
contacts within Afghanistan, especially the Northern Alliance. And Iranian administration, 
including Ayatollah Khamenei and the conservative leadership with their deep enmity 
towards the U.S., understood that supporting the coalition would best serve Iran‟s interests.33 
Supporting the U.S. served Iran in multiple ways: it got rid of the anti-Iran Taliban regime, 
striking a massive blow to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia‟s influence, enhanced Iran‟s reach in 
the region, and facilitated cooperation and better relations with the United States.
34
 As Iran‟s 
foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi declared, “We have some common points with the U.S. over 
Afghanistan.”35 Due to Tehran‟s direct interests, it provided overwhelming support to the 
U.S. efforts: allowed the use of its eastern airports and seaports (namely Chabahar) to U.S. 
transport planes and vessels, offered to perform search and rescue of the downed pilots, and 
assisted with intelligence support.
 36
 
Post the downfall of the Taliban and success at the Bonn Conference, both of which 
would not have been possible without the efforts of Iran, it expected to take home two major 
take-away for the future, stability in Afghanistan and better relationship between United 
States and Iran, not only in Afghanistan but in other spheres as well. Iran saw the success of 
cooperation as „foundation for a broader strategic dialogue between the United States and the 
Islamic Republic.‟37 And Iran did succeed in making a few friends. The U.S. State 
Department was in favour of a strategic opening with Iran, with cooperation over terrorism, 
intelligence sharing, and border sweeps to catch al-Qaeda fighters. But the proposal was not 
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favoured by the Pentagon, and blocked by the hard-liners at the White House, like Cheney 
and Rumsfeld.
38
 Over that happened the incident of Karine-A and President Bush labelling 
Iran as “axis of evil”, which perhaps forms the most damaging incident for U.S.-Iran relations 
in modern times. 
Just a little more than a year after the „axis of evil‟ speech, came the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 
Many, including in U.S. and Israel believed Iran to be the main target, and so did the 
administration in Tehran.
39
 This also made them reluctant at first, but again Iran was 
optimistic and pragmatic. As with Afghanistan, Iran had superior intelligence and familiarity 
with the region, along with some levels of influence, especially among the Shia community 
of Iraq, and with interests in Iraq‟s stability, they hoped to renew the dialogue with United 
States; as Ansari put it “America might know how to get into Iraq, but it will need Iran‟s help 
to get out.”40 Further, although impossible just militarily, but if Saddam would have found a 
way out to ensure the survival of his administration, an emboldened Saddam would have 
been a greater threat to Tehran than the U.S. presence. As with Afghanistan, Iran again 
offered humanitarian assistance and pledged to assist downed pilots, and also pressed its Iraqi 
Shia allies to cooperate, something which is easier said than done given the scepticism 
amongst them.
41
 Also, due to U.S.‟ backing of Shias, Iran expected, rightly so, the post- 
Saddam government to be friendly towards Tehran.
42
 
Another factor Iran had to keep in mind was the role and interests of Iraqi Kurds and 
Turkey. The situation of instability could lead to disintegration of Iraq, with the Kurds in the 
north declaring their independence. This in turn would have caused two major problems for 
Iran: first, the situation might have led to calls for independence from within the Iranian 
Kurds as well, which number around 6 million, and would have led to internal disturbance; 
and second, the power vacuum would have caused involvement of regional powers like 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, something which Iran did not wish.
43
  Therefore, while its support 
towards Kurdish factions, Iran opposes any effort that might lead to formation of a Kurdish 
state and would disturb the regional power balance. At the same time Iran has been worried 
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about Turkish interests in the region, with its perception that Turkey would claim Mosul if 
Iraq collapses and take over the oil fields in northern Iraq.
44
 This along with growing ties 
between Turkey and KRG becomes a source of concern for Tehran with regard to Iraq. 
Also, as in Afghanistan, Iran played a crucial and constructive role towards the 
stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. As Milani has noted, since the establishment of post- 
Saddam government, Iran has “provided Baghdad with more support than even the staunchest 
of the United States‟ allies.”45 Iran played a key role in stabilization of Iraq, pressured its 
Iraqi allies to cease violence against Sunnis or U.S. forces, and pledged more than $1 billion 
for Iraqi reconstruction, mainly in order to create an economic sphere of influence. This is 
evident by the increase in trade relations between the two countries, which surpassed $8 
billion in 2010 and has mostly benefitted Iran. It is also believed that Iran also uses Iraq to 
bypass the sanctions, probably by smuggling oil across the Iranian-Kurdish or the southern 
Iran-Iraq borders.
46
 The other key driver for Iran was its security policy; Iran‟s national 
security is directly affected by the situation in Iraq and it views its influence mainly to 
counter three primary threats: spill over of any ethnic or sectarian conflict into Iran, perceived 
use of Iraqi territory as a launch pad for U.S. actions against Iran, and the presence of anti-
Iran armed militias like Mujahedeen-e Khalq Organization (MEK/MKO) in Iraq. Thus, Iran‟s 
policy during the Iraq‟s invasion of 2003 can best be called, in words of Zimmermann, that of 
“active neutrality”; while it did not directly engage in conflict, it gained a strong foothold by 
infiltrating Iraq‟s vital agencies taking advantage of the regime change, and consolidated its 
influence in Iraq.
47
 
It is worth noting here that United States directly helped Iran in improving its standing 
and influence in the region. On Iran‟s eastern border in Afghanistan was the Taliban, the 
extremist hard-lined Sunni Pashtun with their alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 
responsible for continued hostilities against Iran; on the west was Iraq ruled by Saddam 
Hussein, an old rival of Iran. United States through its 2001 war in Afghanistan and 2003 
invasion of Iraq toppled Iran‟s two most dreaded enemies right next to its border. Iran, who 
had already accepted the reality of the presence of United States under the reformist 
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leadership of President Khatami, saw it as an opportunity to both getting rid of its immediate 
enemies and establishment of their sphere of influence in the region, and hence, was more 
than willing to cooperate with the United States. 
The above paragraphs highlight Iran‟s interests in toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq; what we also need to understand here is Iran‟s interests and desire 
for improved relations for cooperating with the United States. As also previously discussed, 
better relations between the two countries have been stressed by Rafsanjani and Khatami, as 
well as Ayatollah Khamenei‟s own top advisor on foreign policy Mohammad Javad Larijani. 
Better relations with the United States become necessary for a key number of issues: to 
combat Iran‟s key economic problems like unemployment and inflation, lifting of sanctions 
on Iran and finding new markets for its goods and oil and natural reserves, its encirclement 
by the U.S. as a perceived existential threat, and also its nuclear ambitions.  
For Iran, the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq was seen as direct path to mend its relations 
with the U.S. As Parsi has noted, “Tehran is capable of securing its interests in Afghanistan 
and Iraq without the U.S., and feels no need to be helpful unless Washington is willing to 
reciprocate at the strategic level.”48 Also, as noted by a senior diplomat of Iran in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Tehran decided did not qualify their cooperation in 
Afghanistan or make it conditional to change in U.S. policy, expecting that the huge impact 
of the cooperation would by itself build a better relationship; the diplomat also called this 
assumption a big error on their part.
49
 A giant step was taken by Tehran in this regard in May 
2003, just after the success of the invasion of Iraq, in a final attempt to reach out to the U.S. 
Through the Geneva channel, Iran literally put almost everything they had on the table, and 
the proposal bore the approval of Ayatollah Khamenei himself. In their last attempt to seek 
better relations, Iran proposed to end its support to armed non-state actors, cooperation 
against all terrorist organizations, accept peace with Israel, talks on nuclear issue and „mutual 
respect‟, in return of lifting of all sanctions, better cooperation, recognition of Iran‟s 
legitimate security interests and pursuing of peaceful nuclear program.
50
 It was a proposal for 
long term peace and cooperation, but was rejected by the hard liners in White House, 
including Dick Cheney, stating that “we don‟t deal with the evil”; The U.S. rejected the 
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proposal for peace in the region, in what Parsi appropriately called in his book, „Snatching 
defeat from the jaws of victory‟.51 
With all of Iran‟s key regional rivals gone, the biggest threat that Iran faced was definitely 
its encirclement by the United States, a threat which Iran regarded as „existential‟52. This 
probably explains the allegations of Tehran providing limited support to insurgency in Iraq 
and also in Afghanistan; if the U.S. is bogged down with domestic problems in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it would simply not have the resources to attempt anything against the Islamic 
Republic, and thereby also sending a message that if U.S. tries something, Iran has the 
capacity to retaliate through its loyal non-state actors, which would directly lead U.S. into a 
quagmire from which getting out would be extremely difficult. In the words of Ayatollah 
Khamenei himself, “[i]f the U.S. ventured into any aggression on Iran, Iran will retaliate by 
damaging U.S. interests worldwide twice as much as the U.S. may inflict on Iran.”53 
Conclusion 
Although the presence of the United States was already there in the Persian Gulf, the 
attacks of September 11
th
 changed the region forever. The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq 
by the United States led Iran to dispose of its two biggest arch-rivals in the region, the 
Taliban and Saddam Hussein, but directly led to rise of what Tehran perceived as even 
greater and existential threat, the encirclement of Iran by the United States. Iran‟s initial 
cooperation with U.S. was attributed to its two main interests, downfall of Taliban and 
expected improved relations with the United States. Even after the „axis of evil‟ speech, Iran 
willingly cooperated with U.S. in Iraq, pursuing its own national security interests, but along 
with the perception that after Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran could be the next target. Therefore, 
Iran‟s foreign policy in the region (and perhaps the allegations of its support to armed non-
state actors) can be directly seen as a result of this perceived threat. 
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Sub-Question 2: 
Iran’s support to the Karzai government and stabilization of Afghanistan 
 
To the east of Iran sharing more than 900 km of porous border lays Afghanistan, a 
country engulfed in turmoil of war for almost four decades now. Apart from a porous border, 
they both also share a long history of ethnic, linguistic, cultural and economic ties; Iran is 
directly affected by the political-economic situation prevalent in Afghanistan. It is generally 
argued that Iran has always desired a „stable and independent Afghanistan‟, with a 
government appropriately representing the ethnic diversity of the country and is also friendly 
towards Iran.
54
 Iran also sees Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asia and China, making it 
all the more interested in its stability. At the same time it also seeks to prevent any kind of 
further spill-over of the conflict in Afghanistan, which in some sense already plagues Iran. 
Also, Iran does not appreciate the presence of any foreign forces in Afghanistan, and its 
policy is greatly influenced by the presence of United States in the country. 
It can be argued that the Iranian policy towards Afghanistan is shaped by pragmatic 
considerations and cannot be explained simply by the „ideological factor‟ present in Iran‟s 
foreign policy rhetoric. A direct evidence can be seen by the role played by Iran in 
collaboration with the United States in the downfall of the Taliban (discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter), as a key actor towards the success of the 2001 Bonn Conference and its 
support to the Karzai government in Afghanistan. Iran has regularly used its influence in 
Afghanistan to gain influence in the political and economic environment through focusing on 
its relations with the Karzai administration, enhancing its trade and commercial relations, 
support to various warlords and emphasis on the Afghan reconstruction. 
There are several factors controlling the relations of Iran and Afghanistan, what Milani 
calls the „spheres of influence‟: political, economic and cultural.55 Through these spheres 
Tehran has tried to meddle in many aspects in Afghanistan to pursue its security and 
economic interests. Primary of these interests remains the presence of United States in 
Afghanistan, the production and trade of opium, preventing the resurgence of extremist 
groups like the Taliban, economic access to the Afghan markets and to Central Asia and 
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China at large, and establishment of Iran as a regional power. As Milani wrote about the 
Iranian policy in Afghanistan targets four major goals: “to collaborate with the Karzai 
government without abandoning its support for Iran's other allies in Afghanistan; to engage 
heavily in the reconstruction of Afghanistan in order to create an "economic sphere of 
influence"; to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. while pressuring Kabul gradually to 
reduce U.S. influence; and to reduce the flow of narcotics to Iran.”56 
Presence of the United States in Afghanistan: Despite initial cooperation with the United 
States in the downfall of the Taliban to establishing a government under Hamid Karzai and 
extending support to an U.S. favoured Pashtun-led government in Afghanistan, Tehran has 
been vehemently opposed to a long term U.S. presence in Afghanistan. In the words of 
President Rouhani, Iran “is opposed to the presence of any foreign force in the region, the 
Middle East, the Persian Gulf and particularly the Islamic country of Afghanistan… They 
should all leave and leave the security of Afghanistan to its own people.”57  
Iran‟s opposition to U.S. presence serves its foreign policy towards Afghanistan in 
multiple ways. First, it directly affects the stability in Afghanistan. Taliban, which forms the 
primary extremist force in Afghanistan, is comprised mainly of ethnic Pashtun people. In 
accordance to Pashtunwali, which defines the way of life for a Pashtun, the presence of 
foreign „occupying force‟ calls for an „holy war‟ against the invaders.58 This situation implies 
a continued struggle in the form of jihad against the „foreign infidels‟, which also makes the 
situation ripe for growth and spread of extremism and Salafist ideology against those „who 
endanger their ideology and beliefs‟59, which can further lead to instability be becoming a 
possible ground for civil or religious wars. 
Second, the presence of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan is perceived as a direct 
existential threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
60
 Iran believes that the presence of U.S. 
military is a part of greater U.S. policy to hold and reinforce its strategic position in the 
Persian Gulf as well as the South and Central Asian region, which has to come at the expense 
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of Iran‟s interests. In Iran‟s perspective, this undermines Iran‟s position in two ways, by 
sacrificing the neutrality of Afghanistan in regional matters, and greatly undermining the 
influence Iran exercises in Afghanistan. Third, and perhaps what summarizes Iran‟s 
opposition to presence of U.S. troops is the fact that Iran views itself as a regional power, and 
the presence of United States in the region, and especially in its immediate neighbourhood 
both to the east in Afghanistan and the west in Iraq, and not forgetting U.S. relations with 
Pakistan, greatly undermines the ambitions of Iran. 
The problem of Afghan drug trade: Milani regards the issue of opium production and 
drug trade in Afghanistan as the „most contentious issue‟ from Iran‟s perspective.61 
According to UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), about 89 per cent of opium and 39 
per cent of morphine and heroin produced in Afghanistan enters Iran in its way to the 
Western European markets through Turkey. Iran has also been the country with largest 
amounts of drug seizures in Middle East, estimated at 24,926 metric tonnes for 2009, with 
Afghanistan and Pakistan taking second and third spots with 2,188 and 2,116 metric tonnes 
respectively.
62
 Iran has an “extensive and internationally recognized counter-narcotics 
policy”,63 works directly in cooperation with UNODC and also demands and in some cases 
successfully obtains bilateral cooperation from countries in Europe. 
Iran has paid a heavy price for its „war on drugs‟, not only in economic terms of finance 
and resources, but also human lives. According to Iran‟s Interior Minister General Mustafa 
Mohammad Najjar, more than 15,000 of its citizens have been killed or injured in its fight 
against drugs.
64
 About 10 per cent of the Iranian army is posted along the border with 
Afghanistan, which has focused more on counter-narcotics operations rather than 
conventional military roles. Iran has more than 50,000 personnel deployed in order to combat 
the problem of drugs.
65
 Also from 2005-2006, Tehran has contributed annually more than 
$50 million in supporting anti-narcotics efforts of the Afghan government.
66
 But as we are 
aware, after all the financial and human costs, the drug trade is still prevalent, which also 
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affects the Iranian population due to the availability of large quantities of drugs passing 
through the country. UN data suggests that about 3 per cent of the Iranian population over the 
age of 15 is addicted to heroin, and Iran has made it a priority to help them recover from the 
addiction, with immunity from prosecution if they come out voluntarily.
67
 
Another aspect that troubles Iran is the problem of drug trade as a direct threat to stability 
in Afghanistan. According to UNODC report on opium cultivation and production in 
Afghanistan in 2016, net opium poppy cultivation from past year had increased by 10 per 
cent to 201,000 hectares, and potential production of opium by 43 per cent to 4,800 tonnes.
68
 
Revenues from the drug trade have been directly fuelling the insurgency in Afghanistan, but 
as U.S. had aligned itself with support from various Afghan warlords and drug lords, it did 
not challenge the drug trade until October 2008 on the pretext of terrorism being its primary 
target, which allowed the drug trade to flourish in Afghanistan. Hence, Iran has always kept 
the Afghan drug problem on priority, including emphasizing on the issue in bilateral talks.
69
 
Economic assistance towards Afghanistan: Milani calls creation of “economic sphere of 
influence” as one of the main objectives of Iran, with the ultimate goal of developing into a 
hub for transport of goods and services between Persian Gulf and Central Asia, China and 
India through Afghanistan, and also enhance its political and security objectives in the 
region.
70
 Iran has committed itself towards the economic reconstruction and development of 
Afghanistan right since the downfall of the Taliban and the Bonn Conference, committing 
$560 million for Afghan reconstruction in the International Pledging Conference in Tokyo in 
2002 and an additional $100 million in the London Conference on Afghanistan 
Reconstruction in 2006.
71
 Iran has directly assisted in the stabilization of Afghanistan and of 
the Karzai government through various means which has also reinforced Iran‟s role and 
position in Afghanistan. 
The stability and reconstruction of Afghanistan is vital from the standpoint of Iran‟s 
access to Central Asia, China and India. Wilde has argued that Iran is reshaping its foreign 
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policy by lowering the importance of the Middle East region in favour of close relations with 
its eastern neighbourhood. In that regard, the development of Afghan infrastructure and 
importantly the construction of better highways “is closely linked to a policy aiming at 
economic and political cooperation with the Central Asian republics and the setting up of a 
larger regional network.”72 Thus, Iran‟s efforts at infrastructure development in Afghanistan 
can also be seen in part as a strategy to establish a trans-regional cooperation and regional 
integration of Central Asia with a common new market for Iranian exports, industrial and 
agricultural projects, and exploitation of natural resources. The shift in policy can also be 
observed in Iran‟s increasing economic exchanges and energy exports to Asian markets, most 
notably to India and China, which is also vital for economic development of Iran.
73
 
Afghanistan also provides Iran with a direct corridor to China, which reduces their 
dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, which could potentially convert into a choke point. 
Afghanistan also provides Iran with an easy access to a huge market for Iranian goods 
and energy. Since 2002, the amount of trade between both nations has significantly increased, 
making Afghanistan Iran‟s fourth largest trade partner in non-oil exports. As a reference, 
Iran‟s exports to Afghanistan in 2012 amounted to $2.874 billion,74 with more than 2000 
different Iranian companies operating across different sectors. At the same time Iran also 
provides Afghanistan with half of its oil consumption.
75
 Also present in the country is Imam 
Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC), Iran‟s largest charity organization, which works 
directly if the Afghan people, providing payments to newlyweds, support to orphans, loans 
and stipends for basic needs and vocational courses. It thus successfully through economic 
help forms a bond with the local Afghans, which helps in both creating a positive image for 
Iran and gather intelligence.
76
 
Another issue which Tehran is much worried about is the resurgence of extremist groups 
like the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to Barzegar, in Tehran‟s viewpoint “poverty and 
poor development have been the main bases for the revival of the Taliban and extremism in 
the country.”77 From the point of view of stability in the region, Iran does not wish to see the 
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resurgence of Taliban or Sunni extremism on its eastern border. Iran‟s fear is not based on 
ideological perspective but rather on fear of destabilization of Afghanistan, and the fact that 
return of Taliban may also lead to a stronger position for Pakistan in the region. A resurgent 
Taliban and a stronger Pakistan would directly lead to exclusion of Iran from Afghanistan, 
and could tarnish Iran‟s greater strategy for the region. For all these reasons, as Barzegar put 
it, “Iran has always committed itself to reconstruction and development efforts in such fields 
as financial aid, transportation and energy, trade, social structure, and refugee matters.”78  
Conclusion 
Iran‟s foreign policy towards Afghanistan seems to fit in the mould of “classical foreign 
policy”, driven by security, political and economic interests and not inspired by religious or 
ideological priorities, and has contributed more towards overall stabilization of Afghanistan 
than to instability or extremism. Milani has also argued that Iran has followed a moderate 
policy and engaged in reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan, opposed the extremist 
groups like the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and has actively assisted in counter-narcotics.
79
 
Afghanistan also provides Iran with an opportunity of breaking its international isolation with 
renewed connections to China and Central Asia, and re-establish itself as a regional power 
and a hub for economic cooperation. 
Iran has specifically focused on influence through soft power in Afghanistan – increased 
trade, economic aid and reconstruction, infrastructure and business investments, emphasis on 
shared history and cultural diplomacy, gathering information and direct and indirect support 
to different actors. This provides Iran with significant levels of influence in Afghanistan, 
including the Afghan government. A peaceful Afghanistan free from extremist actors like 
Taliban and al-Qaeda and drug trade is essential for Iran‟s economic and security interests in 
the region, as well as its national security concerns with regard to the Taliban and the 
presence of its arch rival United States on its immediate borders. 
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Sub-Question 3: 
Iran’s support to Christian Armenia against Shia Azerbaijan 
To the north of Iran lie its South Caucasus neighbours Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan share territorial border with each other. Again, religious 
demographics also play an important role in the region. On one hand Armenia is a majority 
Christian state, with Christianity forming up 94.8% of the total population of Armenia,
80
 and 
on the other hand is Azerbaijan, with 98% of the population being followers of Islam, and a 
total of more than 83% people being Shia Muslims.
81
 At the same time not only is Iran a 
proponent of Shia Islam, is home to a significant amount of Azeri people (estimates vary 
between 15-20% of Iran‟s population), who also form the largest ethnic minority in Iran.  
Just looking at these factors, it is easy to conclude that Iran should support a Shia 
Azerbaijan against a Christian Armenia in case of a situation of conflict or even in its foreign 
relations. But it is not the case. Post the break-out of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Iran held to 
maintaining a neutral stance, but it is generally observed that it favours Armenia against 
Azerbaijan. This suggests that there is more to Iran‟s South Caucasus policy that just 
religious sentiment. In this chapter I would try to evaluate Iran‟s foreign policy towards its 
neighbours in South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, its relations with both the countries, 
the extent of Iranian commitment, and what might be the factors influencing Iran‟s policy 
formation. 
Historical Perspective to the conflict 
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were part of the former Soviet Republic and gained 
independence in 1991. Post-independence, both were involved in territorial conflict over the 
region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The region was made a part of Azerbaijan by the Soviet Union 
and was inhabited by ethnic Armenians. The region is now under Armenian „occupation‟82, 
with Armenia invoking the principle of „peoples‟ right to self-determination‟ and Azerbaijan 
calling it a violation of territorial integrity.
83
 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict now forms the 
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key driving factor of the foreign policy of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
84
 The three main 
regional powers – Russia, Iran and Turkey, have different outlook towards the conflict. After 
trying to stay neutral at the time of outbreak of the conflict, Turkey openly allied itself with 
Azerbaijan in the armed conflict with Armenia; Iran, however, while claiming to maintain its 
neutrality and offering to mediate the conflict, did extend limited support to Armenia seeking 
to improve its relations.
85
 But any negotiated solution has become very difficult due to 
“Armenia‟s securitization of this region as integral to its own societal identity” and has 
equated its security with the political security of the state.
86
 
Factors influencing Iran’s foreign policy 
The situation of regional security with the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
played a direct role in the relationship of Iran with the region. Considering the crucial nature 
of the conflict with regard to the geopolitics, Iran offered its assistance to both parties to 
reach a peaceful resolution to the escalating conflict, while trying to stay neutral at the same 
time.
87
 Although it is widely considered that Azerbaijan had been subjected to external 
aggression and invasion by Armenia,
88
 and Turkey deciding to support Azerbaijan, Iran was 
inconclusive on supporting any side. Iran, which had based its post-Islamic Revolution policy 
on sectarian basis and portrayed itself as „political leader of Shi‟ism‟, and ethnic Azeri people 
forming the largest minority group of Iran and majority of the population in the north-western 
Iran, it was widely expected that Iran would support Azerbaijan in the conflict against 
Armenia. Rather, Iran allied itself with Armenia, and the relations between the two states 
have been good ever since. 
Perhaps the most helpful in deciding Iranian course of action at that time was the hard-
lined and anti-Iran President of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, who in 1992 went all the way 
to threaten the territorial integrity of Iran, labelled Iran on several occasions as a „doomed 
state‟, and predicted the unity of Azerbaijan (with the Azeri majority parts of Iran) within the 
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next five years.
89
 This was directly indicative of something Iran did not wish in its 
neighbourhood. President Elchibey was overthrown in a coup d‟état in the summer of 1993, 
and many in Azerbaijan alleged Iran‟s involvement into the coup.90 The new Azerbaijani 
President Heydar Aliyev made several visits to Iran and the relations have improved 
significantly since then. Iran and Azerbaijan have signed various bilateral and multilateral 
agreements regarding economic cooperation and extraction and transportation of Azerbaijani 
oil and natural resources. But there still exists a climate of suspicion with Tehran fearing 
Baku‟s support to an independent movement of Azerbaijan.91 
As we can observe, Iran‟s relations in the region with regard to its support to Christian 
Armenia instead of Azerbaijan which is Shia confirms about the nature of Iran‟s policy in the 
region as driven by its geo-political interests and which directly contradicts the rhetoric of 
ideological or religious principles. Iran‟s decisions regarding its foreign policy in the region 
are affected by a number of considerations: political interests, Iran‟s perceived territorial 
threat, economic interests and fear of isolation, presence of foreign actors like the United 
States, and its foremost ambitions of re-establishing itself as the regional power. 
Threat to territorial integrity: The greatest factor influencing the relations has to be what 
was perceived to be a territorial threat by Iran due to its Azeri minority and a rise of a strong 
and rich Azerbaijan. Azeris form Iran‟s largest non-Farsi speaking ethnic minority, with 
almost 15-20 million people, as opposed to around six million in Azerbaijan.
92
 Also, 
Azerbaijan is blessed with large amounts of oil and natural gas resources for its small 
population, which led to rapid prosperity. Iran thus started to realize the threat to Iran‟s 
territorial integrity coming from a strong and rich Azerbaijan. President Rafsanjani realized 
that the emergence of strong and independent Azerbaijan can lead to a rise of Azeri 
nationalism inside Iran, which could prove to be troublesome for Tehran.
93
 So with declining 
economic condition of Iran, it has always seen the emergence of a rich oil-producing 
Azerbaijan as a long-term threat to Iran‟s integrity; Iran prefers a weak Azerbaijan on its 
north, a sovereign state but dependent on outside support.
94
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The threat was first directly identified due to the threatening rhetoric of Azerbaijan‟s 
President Elchibey in 1992, something which also led to Iran developing better relations with 
Armenia. Nevertheless, Iran could not afford to take the risk of a popular uprising in the 
Azeri dominated cities in north-western Iran which might have led to a threat to Iran‟s 
territorial integrity with Iranian Azeris supporting Azerbaijan. Even when the Armenian 
troops marched towards the Iran-Azerbaijan border in October 1993, which threatened a 
major refugee crisis with several Azeris crossing the border into Iran and would have 
threatened their integration with Iranian Azeris and their mobilization in Azerbaijan‟s conflict 
against Armenia, Iran was swift to react. It set up refugee camps not inside its own territory, 
but in Azerbaijani soil. Although setting up of refugee camps outside Iran was expensive, 
economic factor was considered secondary to the „potentially explosive situation‟ of Azeri 
unity and to prevent any pressure by its Azeri minority to intervene.
95
 
This threat of territorial integrity has not only been the driving factor of Iran‟s relations 
with Azerbaijan, but affects its relations with Armenia as well; and although this was the 
factor which first drove Iran to support Armenia, Iran has acted in a pragmatic way with 
priority to its national security interests. When Nakhchivan, an exclave of Azerbaijan faced 
the threat of an attack by Armenia in September 1993, which would have triggered a massive 
flow of refugees across to Araxes River into the Iranian side, Iran mobilized its troops against 
Armenia, which was enough to intimidate it, and the Armenian foreign minister provided his 
assurance to Iran against any attacks on Nakhchivan.
96
 
Economic interests: Iranian leadership has described its relationship with Armenia as 
„strategic‟; Iran and Armenia have signed around ninety MoUs on mutual cooperation, and 
Iran has made multiple infrastructure investments in Armenia.
97
 Economic cooperation with 
Armenia offers Iran some respite from the embargo imposed on it, and helps in increasing „its 
regional effectiveness with energy and transport projects.‟98 Today Iran has established itself 
as Armenia‟s largest trading partner, and is actively trading with the Armenians in Karabakh 
region as well.
99
 According to Iran‟s First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri, annual trade 
between the two nations stands at $300 million, and with Armenia joining the Eurasian 
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Economic Union (EEU), Iran has got access to trade and goods export to a broader market, 
with Armenia forming the crucial trade route for Iran.
100
 
Another big factor that promotes Iran‟s interests in economic cooperation with Armenia is 
the threat of isolation faced due to continued adversary U.S. policies against Iran. To counter 
this threat, Iran‟s support to Armenia works in two ways: first, Armenia has always had good 
relations with Iran and never showed any kind of hostility in the region; Armenia provides 
Iran with electricity and Iran views its commercial relations with Armenia as a pathway to 
trade and energy transport routes leading to European markets
101
, and second, strong relations 
with Armenia also lead to improved relations with Russia which Iran considers crucial 
against U.S. sanctions. 
Since the coming of President Aliyev to power, Iran‟s economic relations with Azerbaijan 
have also improved, especially in terms of exploitation and transportation of Azerbaijan‟s oil 
resources. A potential turn of events came in April 1995 when Azerbaijan expelled Iran from 
a 25 per cent share in an international oil consortium at the behest of United States, driving 
Iran to label President Aliyev as a puppet of the „Great Satan‟. To appease Iran, Aliyev 
offered it a 10 percent share in another consortium in Shah-Deniz, which Iran accepted 
showing its pragmatic decision making, and further tried to establish its influence in oil 
markets and bring economic profits at the same time by signing a deal with Azerbaijan for 
exploitation of two more Azerbaijani oil fields, which amounted to a $1.5 billion deal 
between the two states.
102
 
Political interests: The actions of Azerbaijan‟s President Elchibey led Iran to adopt a 
much more active stance towards Armenia. Ansari wrote about the conflict that Iran “openly 
professed neutrality in the war, but leaned towards Armenia, with some reports that Iran went 
do far as to supply Armenia with weapons. Thus it was that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
supported Christian Armenia over Shia Azerbaijan, because the Azeris had offended Iranian 
national sensibilities.”103 Iran supported Armenia with the required supplies, goods and 
energy, served at least as a transit route if not directly supplying weapons to Armenia, and it 
has also allegedly trained the Armenian fighters; Iran just stopped short of any kind of 
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military involvement.
104
 Iran‟s support to Armenia was also vital considering what Iran 
perceived to be a grave territorial threat to its sovereignty, which will be discussed in detail in 
the further sections. 
At the same time Iran is aware of the political dependency of Armenia on it, which is also 
evident by the fact that Armenia is one of the only regional actors to have never shown any 
hostility against Iran. This was best understood when in 2005 President Ahmadinejad gave 
his infamous statement against Israel and denial of the Holocaust, Vartan Oskanian, the then-
foreign minister of Armenia refrained from evaluating the issue in respect of bilateral 
relations with Iran.
105
 Armenia has always given due respect to its relations with Iran and has 
made sure nothing jeopardizes these relations, like when in 1994 Armenian forces 
accidentally shot down an Iranian military plane, Armenian officials travelled to Iran without 
any delay to make sure that the relations between the two nations are not affected, and the 
trade values actually grew after this incident.
106
 Also, Armenia is perhaps the only country in 
the region which has always vocally supported Iran‟s nuclear program.107 
Presence of external actors: Another thing that displeases Iran is the presence of United 
States in Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea region. The United States has solidly penetrated the 
region. President Ahmadinejad in 2006 expressed Iran‟s opposition towards any “foreign 
interference” in the Caspian region. In May 2005, Iran and Azerbaijan also signed a non-
aggression mutual pact, but at the same time Azerbaijan has also shown their military 
cooperation with the United States.
108
 Iran has always been sceptical regarding the presence 
of United States in its neighbourhood, and sees it as a direct challenge to its ambitions of 
being a regional power. Also, the presence of U.S. and its military cooperation with 
Azerbaijan generates a potential threat of use of Azerbaijani territory in case of a future U.S. 
aggression against Iran. Therefore, Azerbaijan‟s cooperation with the United States further 
drives Iran‟s relations with Azerbaijan; Iran does not wish to see a strong U.S. ally in the 
region that might be used against it. Iran has also found an ally Russia as a common foe to 
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Azerbaijan. Iran is also keen on cooperating with Russia as a show of standing up against the 
U.S. pressure on their isolation policy.
109
 
Conclusion 
The conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh still plays an important role in influencing the foreign 
policy in the region. The position of Iran during the conflict also shows a great awareness on 
its part – if the Armenian troops had brought about a failure of the Azerbaijan state, it would 
have deteriorated the internal political scenario of Iran significantly; the people of Iran, both 
Azeri minority as well as Persian majority, might not have tolerated that.
110
 Iran therefore, 
while supporting Armenia made sure that it did not go to the extent of causing a power 
imbalance in the region. It has also been noted that for Iran‟s policy, “economic interests 
tended to outweigh any desire to spread potentially destabilizing ideology to the region.”111 
Dorsey has also stated that, “Few nations have less in common at first glance than 
Armenia and Iran.”112 Even then, Iran has maintained with Armenia a strong bilateral relation 
over the years based on political, economic and cultural cooperation. As can be observed 
from the analysis above of Iran‟s relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, it would not be 
wrong to arrive at the conclusion that Iran‟s foreign policy with regard to its northern 
neighbours is based on pragmatic decision making and does not depend on the ideological 
perspective of Shia Islam or Islamic Revolution. We can also point out that the foreign policy 
decisions depend on a range of factors including territorial threat, economic and commercial 
relationship, political considerations, and also the threat of isolation and the role of external 
actors in the region. Evaluating Iran‟s foreign relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan reveals 
a rational and pragmatic perspective; as Cornell also wrote about the relationship between 
Iran and Armenia, “the existence of such co-operation shows that the age of Realpolitik is not 
over, given the different worldviews of the principal actors.”113 
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Discussion 
Since the Islamic Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, the region around 
Iran has witnessed a plethora of geo-political changes and conflicts. The two major events 
under Ayatollah Khomeini were the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and 
the 1980 invasion of Iran by Saddam Hussein which led to the Iran-Iraq War which lasted for 
almost eight years. After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
was declared as the Supreme Leader of Iran (incumbent). Post-1989 scenario of the region 
was no different, and although Iran did not have to face external military aggression, it was 
directly affected by the evolving external conflicts.  
First was the 1991 Gulf War, when U.S.-led coalition attacked Iraq in response to its 
invasion of Kuwait, and brought U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf and at immediate borders of 
Iran. This was soon followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and independence of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan on Iran‟s northern borders. Both nations were in a state of conflict 
over their claims on the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, and a full scale war erupted in the 
winters of 1992; the conflict is still on-going. Along with the troubles on the northern 
borders, a situation of civil war prevailed on Iran‟s eastern borders in Afghanistan, which led 
to the formation of the Taliban in 1994 and its rise to power and takeover of the Afghan 
government in 1996. The hard-lined anti-Shia anti-Iran Taliban government had hostile 
relations with the Islamic Republic, and almost reached a state of open war in 1998. 
The attacks of September 11 changed the situation altogether by bringing significant U.S. 
forces in the region, first in Afghanistan in 2001 followed by Iraq in 2003, thereby also 
completing the encirclement of Iran. But at the same time U.S. helped Iran‟s position in the 
region, by getting rid of its two of the biggest enemies on either side, and at the same time 
providing hope of better relations in the future through their cooperation in both the 
countries. It can be observed that over the years, Tehran has put religious ideology and 
sectarianism on a backburner and gave way to pragmatic decision making with regard to 
national security and economic interests in its foreign policy, with a goal of promoting 
stability in the neighbourhood and establishing its political and economic spheres of 
influence, and marching towards a greater objective of re-establishing itself as a regional 
power. 
The first evidence can be seen in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan on Iran‟s northern borders, where Iran went directly against its ideological 
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rhetoric of Shia Islam and the Islamic Revolution when it, while claiming neutrality, actively 
extended its support to Christian Armenia as opposed to Shia Azerbaijan. The religion was 
side-lined to give way to national security and economic interests. Iran‟s policy towards the 
conflict can be best described as „active neutrality‟, which did not only determine Tehran‟s 
stance towards the conflict, but also led to shaping of its relations with both the countries in 
short to medium term. A challenge to Iran‟s territorial integrity and regional influence as 
posed by a strong Azerbaijan, together with its economic and political interests and 
favourable terms with Armenia motivated Iran‟s policy in South Caucasus neighbourhood. 
At the same time Iran has been pragmatic and realist in face of any threat due to the 
actions of its ally Armenia as well; the threat posed by Armenian invasion of Nakhchivan and 
Iran‟s mobilization of its forces to prevent that and send a message at the same time is a 
testimony of that. Also, setting up on refugee camps not on Iranian territory but on the border 
side inside Azerbaijan sets to demonstrate that money and expenses is not a problem for 
Tehran as much as the integrity and keeping any threat at bay amongst its own population. 
And although offended when it was expelled from the oil consortium deal by Azerbaijan, it 
was pragmatic on signing a deal in another sector with Azerbaijan when it observed genuine 
interests from the other side and considering opportunities of economic profits and at the 
same time better political relations with Azerbaijan.  
Around almost the same time, Iran was faced by a hostile government on its eastern 
borders in Afghanistan. When given a chance in 2001, it did not hesitate in collaborating with 
one of its „greatest enemies‟ United States, and actively assisted in the downfall of the 
Taliban and efforts in bringing stability in Afghanistan by supporting the new government led 
by a Sunni Pashtun, and massive reconstruction efforts. Tehran was a crucial ally in the 
success of the invasion and the Bonn Conference that followed, where it extensively used its 
influence and contacts in the region in general and within the Northern Alliance in particular. 
Also keeping in mind to strengthen its reach and influence in the country, Tehran was 
generous enough in supplying Afghanistan with huge sums of money for reconstruction, and 
bribing the officials at the same time to keep its hold intact in pursuing its interests in the 
region. Instability in Afghanistan is also a direct threat to national security of Iran, due to 
terrorism, drug smuggling, and a massive presence and inflow of Afghan refugees to Iran, 
and any spill-over of the crisis, and Tehran has been actively engaged in keeping a check on 
these problems. 
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A strong hold in Afghanistan becomes all the more important considering its geographic 
location and the access it provides to Central Asia and China, the former regarded as a natural 
sphere of influence by Tehran. Access to the region also provides Iran access to larger 
economic markets for its goods and natural resources, and an effective measure to counter the 
regime of sanctions placed against it. In strengthening its hold, Iran was not afraid of using all 
the tools available in its basket, a shared common culture, religion, economic aid and natural 
resources, and most importantly its knowledge and expertise of the region. Stability of 
Afghanistan is also important considering it to a primary for pipeline politics in the region, 
and Tehran‟s interests in pipeline projects to Indian and Chinese markets. 
One factor that has influenced Iran‟s policy throughout the time frame is the presence of 
United States in the region. Better relations with the U.S. were first voiced by President 
Rafsanjani, and saw active efforts in that direction when reformist Mohammad Khatami 
became the president; Iran had always opposed the presence of U.S. forces in the Persian 
Gulf, but it was under President Khatami that Tehran accepted the reality and showed their 
willingness to live with it. Tehran regularly advocated improved relations with Washington, 
especially with regard to economic and scientific cooperation, something which was much 
needed for Iran due to the sanctions imposed on it and also to control its rising unemployment 
and high inflation.  
The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States was seen as a huge 
opportunity by Tehran, as a path to better relations with the U.S. and getting rid of the 
Taliban and Saddam Hussein, both a direct threat to the Islamic Republic. Getting rid of its 
enemies on either side also gave Iran an opportunity to consolidate its hold and influence in 
both the countries, develop better political and economic relations with the new governments, 
thereby creating its spheres of influences in both. Better relations with the United States 
would also have led to lifting or at least easing of sanctions imposed on the country, and 
would have assisted Iran in realizing its nuclear ambitions, for which Washington has been 
one of the strictest opponents. 
But one of Iran‟s fears which came into being after the U.S. invasion of Iraq was that U.S. 
had completed the encirclement of the Islamic Republic. U.S. had its presence in the Persian 
Gulf, military cooperation with Azerbaijan, and now in Afghanistan and Iraq as well. It is 
also worth noting here that Iran has not involved militarily in any conflict post the Iran-Iraq 
War, so it has directed its policy towards its support to non-state actors, both armed and 
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unarmed Shia and Sunni groups, through which it also exerts part of its influence in the 
region and also on United States. They also serve as a means to convey that if any kind of 
action is taken against the Islamic Republic, they hold the strings to stability of the region and 
have the capacity to engage any aggression into a predicament, and make the cost of the same 
unbearable. 
Looking at armed conflicts in Iran‟s immediate neighbourhood and its response towards 
them, a policy of „active neutrality‟ can be observed. Though using its military to convey a 
threat, it has stopped short of any direct military involvement. Rather, harnessing its 
intelligence and realpolitik policy, it has taken sides in the conflicts through economic aid 
and assistance, logistics to even providing military training and arms and equipment to 
different sides and non-state actors, thereby minimizing its risks while maximizing benefits, 
an approach typical to realpolitik. This policy has also accredited Iran with significant levels 
of soft power and influence within different parts of region, the official governments and the 
local power holders and warlords, which Tehran actively uses to pursue its realpolitik 
interests. 
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Conclusion 
Iran‟s foreign policy has evolved substantially since the time of the Islamic Revolution in 
1979, passing through almost a decade of war and more than three and a half decades of 
sanctions and conflicts in its neighbourhood. A major shift came after the demise of 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, and especially under the presidency of Akbar Rafsanjani and 
Mohammad Khatami. Although both were pragmatic leaders, Khatami specifically has been 
accredited with the vital shift in Iran‟s foreign policy, with his anti-isolationist position and 
promotion of better relations with the United States as being key and a necessity to Iran‟s 
economic development, by arguing that “We may be able to close the door to a certain extent, 
and in some areas. But given the way the world is progressing, tomorrow it would be 
impossible to close the doors”.114 Iran‟s foreign policy under Khatami was predicated on 
“détente, mutual respect and dialogue,” with a shift away from terrorism and violence and 
towards building cooperation, as Khatami himself said, “Foreign Policy does not mean guns 
and rifles but utilizing all means to convince others.”115 
The most important drivers in Iran‟s foreign policy in its neighbourhood are its national 
security and economic interests, which seem to go hand in hand in most of the cases. From its 
policy decisions on support to Armenia, cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and its support towards stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan all point in 
the direction of pragmatism in the foreign policy, decisions which directly have an effect on 
improving both security as well as economic standing of Tehran in the whole region. It also 
shows a tendency of continued support towards its allies, using all possible tools to advance 
its standing and influence in the region; religion, culture, economic aid, reconstruction, trade 
and cooperation, support to de-facto and local power holders, all serve as means to advance 
its national interests in terms of the policy of realpolitik.  
The role of its economic interests has increased over the years in Iran‟s foreign policy, 
and now serves as a key driver in Tehran‟s decision making. Better relations and economic 
influence in its immediate neighbourhood grants Iran with easy access to markets not only in 
those countries, but through them to the greater part of the region in general. It also provides 
as an opportunity to retaliate against the regime of sanctions put against Iran by the United 
States, thereby making these connections all the more important. 
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Although there are several proofs that Iran still continues to support some armed non-
state actors, the support has more to it than simply the agenda of Islamic revolution and 
religious ideology; they serve more as vehicles for serving its geo-political goals rather than 
the spread of the revolution. They serve as a means of pursuing its pragmatic foreign policy 
goals, and ensuring its influence in the region. Especially with regard to Afghanistan and 
Iraq, any limited support to an insurgent group serves a purpose for Tehran by upholding its 
influence in the territory and at the same time keeping the U.S. forces bogged down, thereby 
anticipating for an early exit of the foreign forces and also sending a message against any 
possible hostility against the Islamic Republic in the future. 
Iran‟s foreign policy shows an excellent understanding of the region, and its flexibility of 
working with various actors to advance its interests, specifically through its dealings with 
both Shia and Sunni groups and warlords. It does not hesitate in collaborating with actors 
with whom it had been at loggerheads in the past if it helps in advancing its agendas, nor does 
it hesitate in dealing with other states if it is assumed to be favourable for the Islamic 
Republic, especially when it comes to economic benefits. Ideology and sectarianism mainly 
form a part of Iran‟s domestic rhetoric, but the foreign policy is formed on the basis of 
pragmatic interests and decision making. Iran‟s decisions are based on a detailed cost-benefit 
analysis, and although ideology and sectarianism plays a role in the rhetoric, the foreign 
policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, specifically with regard to its immediate neighbours, is 
guided by pragmatic national security and economic considerations and not on the ideas of an 
Islamic Revolution. 
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Limitations and points for future 
At the same time there are also some limitations to the work above, or rather scope for 
future research. The main limitation is the discussion on Iran‟s nuclear program; it is almost 
impossible to paint a complete picture without getting into the frame Iran‟s nuclear ambitions 
and what they call their right for the same. Iran‟s foreign policy for almost the last decade and 
a half has focused a lot on and revolved around the issue of nuclear power. Being a signatory 
state of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the fact that IAEA did not find any evidence 
of military purposes of its nuclear program, Tehran has always stressed that the program is 
solely for peaceful purposes. While U.S. had continued its objections towards the program, 
its neighbours like Armenia and Iraq have supported Iran‟s right to a peaceful nuclear 
program.
116
  
Although things have taken a turn with Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 
colloquially the Iran nuclear deal signed in 2015, many presumptions still remain, more so 
with the presidency of Donald Trump, who has publicly been vocal in his opposition of the 
deal. Except for a few points, it was not much emphasised for two main reasons: first, 
because of the concentration of this study in the situations of armed conflict in Iran‟s 
immediate neighbourhood, and second, that the deal is still in its initial phase and the 
uncertainty that looms under the Trump presidency. Perhaps a further study of the topic can 
talk more about the role of nuclear diplomacy in the region. 
Also, the study talks about Iran‟s policy in general and does not go deep into the roles of 
different individuals and organizations. The views of the President and the Parliament, 
Ayatollah and the Guardian Council, bodies like Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) 
and military, and perhaps most importantly, views of the ruling president as being reformist 
or conservative, moderate or hard-lined. Therefore, it does not specifically go into the roles 
and changes under the leadership of different Presidents, for example, moderate Khatami 
versus hard-lined Ahmadinejad. Along with that the difference in domestic rhetoric in 
comparison to pragmatic foreign policy decisions needs to be studied. A deeper and more 
detailed study of Iran‟s political atmosphere is required to emphasize on this aspect. 
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